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I. INTRODUCTION
Since early in the twentieth century, communication via radio waves
has been an integral part of modern American society. At its base, radio
communication is the conversion of some form of communication into
electromagnetic signals that are cast broadly across a terrain where the
signals can be received and reconverted into the original communication.
Radio communications are used for mass media as well as technical and
governmental purposes, and have had a profound effect on everyday life,
the experience of space and time, and ultimately the modern sense of
self and society.1
Broadcasters are able to communicate at a distance using technology
that manipulates electromagnetic waves. Only a finite number of
electromagnetic waves can carry usable signals. In effect, these scarce
usable waves constitute an invisible slice of atmosphere that only a
limited number of communicators can use at one time. Part II of this
Comment describes the current technological practices that enable
broadcasters to communicate using the electromagnetic spectrum.
Early in the history of radio communication in the United States, the
government claimed dominion over the useful slice of spectrum and has
since endeavored to administer this public property in “the public
interest.”2 Not surprisingly, considering the pervasive presence and
power of mass communications in modern society, analysis of the
government’s shifting conception and practice of the public interest,
contained in Part III of this Comment, reveals different legal theories,
significant court battles, and political values that shift over time.
In recent history, regulation of the airwaves in the public interest has
been portrayed by legal scholars as a shift from government regulation
to market regulation, which is generally viewed as the triumph of
economic rationality.3 But the idea that the history of the public interest
1. For analyses of the transformations of modern life and personhood associated
with the development of mass communication, see KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED
SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE (1991); DAVID HARVEY, THE
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990); Douglas Kellner, Popular Culture and the
Construction of Postmodern Identities, in MODERNITY AND IDENTITY 141 (Scott Lash &
Jonathan Friedman eds., 1992).
2. See Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard:
The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1997).
3. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 207–10 (1982); Krasnow & Goodman,
supra note 2, at 616, 629. See generally THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE,
JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994) (describing the FCC’s historical
regulation of radio licenses as infringing on First Amendment rights and advocating a
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standard is one of progressive enlightenment that has reached its end
misconstrues the historical and continuing political struggles.
By the mid-1990s, government policy makers who had largely
accepted the market regulation model over the previous two decades
faced a new grassroots challenge. Across the country, unlicensed, lowpower “pirate” or “micro” radio stations were proliferating.4 Generally
broadcasting one to ten watts of power and with ranges less than three
miles,5 most low-power stations were started by people who felt their
interests, perspectives, and tastes were not represented by the available
broadcast media.6 Considering the public nature of the broadcast spectrum,
the authorities found themselves in the awkward position of shutting
down the most local of radio stations and confiscating their broadcast
equipment.7
Faced with legal challenges8 and, in 1998 alone, over 13,000 inquiries
from people and groups interested in starting low-power stations, the
government relented, and in January 2000, completed a process creating
a new low-power FM (LPFM) service.9 In the space of two years, the
FCC had gone from raiding and shutting down microradio stations to
inviting applications for low-power broadcast licenses. Such a dramatic
shift in policy could only come about through a reinterpretation of the
public interest standard. Part III of this Comment continues by analyzing
private property approach).
4. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint ¶ 56, Free Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63 (2d
Cir. 1999) (No. 98 Civ. 2680), available at http://artcon.rutgers.edu/papertiger/nyfma/str/
lawsuit.html (last visited June 6, 2001) [hereinafter Free Speech Complaint], .
5. In 1978, National Public Radio successfully lobbied to clear the lower range of
the FM broadcast band of low-power, noncommercial stations. Since then, the FCC has
had no provisions for licensing low-power stations, effectively banning broadcasts under
100 watts from the American airwaves—at least legally. See GREG RUGGIERO,
MICRORADIO & DEMOCRACY: (LOW) POWER TO THE PEOPLE 18 (1999).
6. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 56; Fatima Fofana, Creating a
Diversity of Voices: Local Expression Through a Low-Power Radio Service, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 409, 415 (1999).
7. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 57–60.
8. The FCC eventually won the suits that have come to court: the agency
prevailed on procedural grounds in United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2000). Constitutional issues were reached and decided in the FCC’s favor in Free
Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999). See infra Part III.D.
9. The initial proposal for a low-power service was contained in the Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 14 F.C.C.R. 2471 (1999) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Making].
The figure of 13,000 inquiries is contained in paragraph 11 of the Proposed Rule
Making. The structure of the new LPFM service was announced in a Report and Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000) [hereinafter FCC’s Low-Power Service].
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the concept of the public interest that underlies the new LPFM service
and locating this conception in the continuing history of the government
regulation of the broadcast spectrum.
This Comment concludes by suggesting that the “public interest” is
and should remain a public policy question, subject to democratic
controls through national elections. Following that reasoning, courts
should continue their historical practice of deferring to rationally based
FCC conceptions as to what constitutes the public interest.
II. USING THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM:
THE TECHNOLOGY OF RADIO BROADCASTING
The technology of radio broadcasting is based on the use and
manipulation of electromagnetic radiation.10 Theories of electromagnetic
radiation were first developed in the middle of the nineteenth century.11
After slightly over half a century of trial and error, experimenters had
created reliable ways to transmit and receive radiation that had been
converted into communication signals.12 This “radio telephone” technology
was to become the kernel for the new kind of information-based mass
society in which we still live.
At a basic level, radio transmission consists of converting sounds into
radiating energy that can be reconverted into the original sounds by a
receiver.13 A sound is a wave of vibrating atmospheric molecules bumping
against adjacent molecules.14 A sustained sound is a series of such waves,
one after the other, occurring at intervals or frequencies that change
when the sound changes.15 A sound made into a microphone creates an
electric sound signal that changes in voltage at the same rate or frequency as
the original sound.16 This stream of changing voltages coming from the
microphone is the electric “translation” of the changing sound waves and
is the communication signal that will be transmitted.17
10. See Radio, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2267 (Barbara A. Chernow & George
A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed. 1993).
11. See Electromagnetic Radiation, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 10,
at 850.
12. See Radio, supra note 10, at 2267; THE ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING HANDBOOK
1513 (Richard C. Dorf ed., 2nd ed. 1997); Thomas H. White, United States Early Radio
History, Part I, available at http://www.ipass.net/~whitetho/part1.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2001).
13. See DAVID MACAULAY, THE WAY THINGS WORK 254–55 (1988); Radio, supra
note 10, at 2267.
14. See SHANE CLOUDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE
PROPAGATION AND ANTENNAS 4 (1995).
15. See MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 230; JIM SINCLAIR, HOW RADIO SIGNALS
WORK 42 (1997).
16. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 236, 254–55.
17. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 236.
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Before transmission, the weak and highly refined sound signal must be
“attached” to a more powerful “carrier wave.”18 A carrier wave, or
carrier signal, is a stream of electric current generated by an oscillator.19
Some characteristic of this streaming carrier wave is modulated in
accordance with the sound signal’s stream of changing voltages; as the
sound signal’s stream of voltage changes, so the carrier signal is made to
vary.20 In this way, the sound signal is encoded into the carrier signal.21
This combined signal—a stream of changing voltages—is then
applied to a transmitting antenna.22 The signal causes electrons in the
antenna to oscillate at the same varying rates as the signal.23 All jiggling
electrons produce waves of electromagnetic radiation; in a radio
transmitting antenna, the electrons are oscillating at the specific rates of
the signal, and thus are producing or “propagating” electromagnetic
waves that pulse at the same rate as the signal.24 Depending on the
power output of the transmitter, the radio waves coming from the
transmitting antenna travel some distance, dispersing along the way,
until they are too weak to be received by normal radio equipment.25
Before they dissipate, radio waves can be picked up by antennas
attached to receivers where the sound to radiation process is reversed
and the signal is converted to audible sound by a loudspeaker.26
Radio signals are sent and received on carrier waves.27 Carrier waves
are distinguished by the frequency of their waves—by how many waves
are transmitted per second.28 In order to hear two radio signals at the
same location, they must be on carrier waves with different frequencies.29
18. See id.; SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 21; Radio, supra note 10, 2268.
19. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254–55; Radio, supra note 10, at 2268.
20. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 7–8; Modulation, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 10, at 1800.
21. In an AM (amplitude modulation) radio broadcast, the power or amplitude of
the carrier wave is modulated. FM (frequency modulation) broadcasts modulate the
frequency of the carrier wave. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254; SINCLAIR, supra note
15, at 45–47; see Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; Modulation, supra note 20, at 1800.
22. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268. “Antennas are metal or dielectric structures
which are engineered to provide an efficient launch of electromagnetic waves into
space.” CLOUDE, supra note 14, at 41.
23. Antenna, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 10, at 114.
24. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254.
25. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 38.
26. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 256.
27. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254.
28. Id.; see SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 17.
29. See MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 255–56.
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If two FM stations are transmitted at the same carrier frequency they will
interfere with each other and only one will be receivable at a given
moment; generally the more powerful signal will capture the receiver.30
In order to avoid interference, each radio signal needs a “definite width
of spectrum” (a unique cluster of frequencies), called “occupied bandwidth”
or “channel spacing,” that no other station in the area will use.31 Thus,
“[t]he radio spectrum is a limited resource. . . . [T]here are only so many
[frequencies] of [electromagnetic] spectrum space in existence that can
be effectively used in a given region at a given time.”32 The limited
spectrum space means that a limited number of radio signals can be
received and a limited number of “voices” can be heard in a particular
place.
Like all communication, radio broadcasting is a joint activity,
requiring sender and receiver to use the proper equipment and be tuned
to a particular frequency.33 It is also an inherently public activity; once a
signal is transmitted at a particular frequency, any unobstructed receiver
within range that is tuned to that frequency will pick up the
transmission.34 A broadcaster can mask or distort a signal, but whatever
signal she transmits is out there for any receiver within range to pick up.
The inherently public nature of radio broadcasting is manifest in another
characteristic: as energy or radiation, electromagnetic waves pass
through air, trees, frame buildings, and even human bodies;35 by their
nature, radio transmissions physically occupy atmosphere, public space,
and private space. In a sense, radio broadcasters create their own monsoon
of electromagnetic waves in which everyone within range lives. Thus,
the equipment to transmit radio signals can be owned, but the spaces
through which the signals travel cannot.36
The inherently limited and public nature of radio broadcasting has
become a central issue in how broadcasting is organized as a social practice.
The remainder of this Comment will explore and compare three conceptual
30. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 48.
31. Id. at 18; see MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254–56.
32. STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547–48
(1999). New technologies may be able to create and receive finer-frequency
discriminations, which would make more signals usable, but with any technology, the
number of useful frequencies will be finite.
33. See, e.g., MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 230–31, 256.
34. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 132.
35. See GIBILISCO, supra note 32, at 13–14.
36. Some writers have suggested that the right to broadcast at a particular
frequency be subject to property ownership principles. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959); Brian C. Fritts,
Note, Private Property, Economic Efficiency, and Spectrum Policy in the Wake of the C
Block Auction, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 849, 852 (1999). This idea will be discussed infra
Part III.C.
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schemes designed to organize broadcasting in accord with its public
nature and in the “public interest.”
III. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION OF THE
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
A. Radio and the Idea of Government Regulation
Before the government could establish a regulatory regime for the
electromagnetic spectrum, a new idea had to emerge: the idea that the
spectrum could and should be controlled.
The earliest radio broadcasts consisted of experimenters sending series
of short and long tones comprising Morse code messages.37 Originally,
military planners and large corporations adopted radio pioneer Guglielmo
Marconi’s vision that radio signals would be used as point-to-point
communications that could be used to coordinate far flung activities,
such as navigation at sea.38 The fact that signals tended to spread from
the direct line between a control center and the recipient was seen as a
flaw in the technology that corporate engineers tried to eliminate.39 The
potential for “broadcasting” was initially realized by the many amateur
radio experimenters who proliferated in the first decade of the twentieth
century.40 The growing numbers of amateurs sending signals caused concern
among military and corporate planners who viewed the situation as one
of “chaos” in which the potential usefulness of the new technology
would be drowned out in millions of individual, more or less purposeless
voices.41
In the wake of the sinking of the Titanic, for example, the military
claimed rescue efforts had been hampered by the interference of radio
amateurs.42 A sudden concern with public safety at sea led to regulation
by Congress in the Radio Act of 1912.43 Scholar Thomas Streeter points
out that while the 1912 Act is “[o]ften treated as a mere footnote in the
37.
38.

See White, supra note 12.
THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 59–60, 68–74 (1996).
39. Id. at 61, 71.
40. Id. at 61, 64–65. The word “broadcasting” was originally an agricultural term
for a manner of planting seed in which the seeds (like today’s radio signals) were spread
or cast broadly. Broadcast, in THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 118–19
(Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).
41. STREETER, supra note 38, at 74.
42. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 5–6.
43. STREETER, supra note 38, at 77.
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history of spectrum regulation, . . . [the Act] asserted several basic
principles upon which U.S. regulation of the spectrum has been based
ever since.”44 First, the Act “clearly asserted the principle of legally
sanctioned limitations on spectrum access,” legislating which parts of
the spectrum would be used for what purposes.45 The most useful
portions of the spectrum were limited to and divided between the Navy
and commercial operators, like the Marconi Company, which conducted
radio communications for ships at sea.46 Second, use of the spectrum to
transmit signals was characterized “more as a privilege than a right.”47
Notably, the privilege was to be enforced by federal agencies, which, in
the name of the public good, would issue licenses to broadcast radio
signals.48
Within these arrangements, however, little regulatory power was provided
by the Act. The Secretary of Commerce was given the duty of issuing
broadcast licenses and assigning the frequencies at which licensees would
operate, but there was no authority to deny applications.49 After 1920,
when businesses, churches, and community groups began to realize the
communicative powers of broadcasting to audiences at regular times on
a regular frequency, the growing numbers of broadcasters reprised the
era of chaotic interference.50 This time, the concern was not for ship
safety, but that too many conflicting signals would render the broadcast
spectrum virtually useless.51 Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover’s
attempts to regulate the growing “chaos” of interfering and floating
stations by enforcing assigned frequencies and scheduling different
licensees’ broadcasts at different times were ruled by federal courts to be
beyond the legislative mandate of the 1912 Act.52
44. Id. at 78.
45. Id.
46. Id. Amateurs were limited to shortwave frequencies, which were thought to be
of little practical value. See also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 6.
47. STREETER, supra note 38, at 78.
48. Id. Fifty years later, this decision would come under attack by academics who
advocated a property rights approach to spectrum allocation, but at the time there was
little support for such an idea. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 15. The
property rights approach is discussed infra Part III.C.1.
49. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 608.
50. Id.; KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9.
51. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 12.
52. See id. at 9, 11–12; see also Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 609 & nn.
15–16. The cases in which Hoover’s power to regulate broadcast licenses under the
1912 Act was construed narrowly were Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) (affirming Commerce Secretary’s power to assign frequencies to and set the
hours of use by license holders, but denying discretionary power to deny applications for
licenses), writ of error dismissed as moot, 266 U.S. 636 (1924), and United States v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (holding that the Commerce
Secretary’s only power was to select the frequencies that licensees as a class could use;
he had no authority to place restrictions on uses of the license).
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In response to the threat of interference and the inability of the
Secretary to control it, Hoover organized a series of annual Radio
Conferences (1922–1925) in which the major players in broadcasting
came together to discuss problems and propose a new framework.53
Thomas Streeter points out that, “Hoover’s decision to organize the
conferences simply reflected the principle articulated by Woodrow
Wilson several years before: ‘the truth [is] that, in the new order,
government and business must be associated.’”54 At the end of the first
Radio Conference, the conferees unanimously resolved that “it is the
sense of the Conference that Radio Communication is a public utility
and as such should be regulated and controlled by the Federal Government
in the public interest.”55 This conception was balanced in the legislative
proposal of the final Radio Conference, which suggested “[t]hat in order
to insure [sic] financial stability to radio enterprises, capital now
invested must receive reasonable protection.”56 This balancing bolsters
Streeter’s assertion that:
In suggesting [that] the public good should be the dominant criteria [sic] in
broadcasting, the conferences were not trying to remove it from private
influence. The public interest was part of a legal and rhetorical strategy for
organizing broadcasting’s further development as a commercial, for-profit
institution. The “public interest” was not thought of as in opposition to
commercial organization. Rather, it was a criterion for use by knowledgeable
experts to help make complicated decisions in the process of serving the larger
business system.57

B. Spectrum Scarcity and the Public Interest
Eventually, with the commercial spectrum jammed with over 700
stations that changed frequencies and increased broadcasting power at
will, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.58 The Act implemented
53. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9; STREETER, supra note 38, at 88.
54. STREETER, supra note 38, at 88.
55. To Amend the Radio Act of 1912: Hearings on H.R. 11964 Before the House
Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 67th Cong. 32 (1923), quoted in
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9.
56. Radio Control: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1764 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong. 42 (1926), quoted in STREETER, supra note 38, at 89.
Streeter suggests that “[t]he aura of mysterious technical complexity that surrounded
radio technology in the 1920s” played a role in tempering “potential discord concerning
government intervention and corporate favoritism.” Id. at 92.
57. Id. at 93–94.
58. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
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many of the ideas of the Radio Conferences, including federal regulation
of the broadcast spectrum in the “public interest.”59 Responding to the
chaos of interfering signals created by the 1912 Act, the 1927 Act
legislated the federal government’s right to restrict access to the
spectrum. Licenses to broadcast were free, but recipients were required
to render public service in exchange for the privilege.60 Another aspect
of the 1927 Act that would only later become controversial was the
declaration that there would be no private ownership of the spectrum,
only a temporary grant of privilege (originally three years) to use the
resource now deemed public.61
1. The FCC and the Electromagnetic Spectrum
The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 instituted a
regime of public ownership of the airwaves, with the government
granting temporary broadcasting privileges to operators who agreed to
operate in the public interest.62 The Federal Radio Commission (FRC) was
created by the Radio Act of 1927; in 1934 the Communications Act
replaced the FRC with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).63
The FCC was given a broader administrative scope than its predecessor
agency, but in terms of radio regulation, the FCC took over the regulatory
regime of the FRC.64
The FCC is the federal agency responsible for executing federal
communication policies mandated by Congress.65 As with other federal
agencies, Congress’s mandate to the FCC66 is generally broad, and calls
for the agency to develop more specific policies and rules within that
mandate.67
With regard to the electromagnetic spectrum, the FCC has a three59. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 13.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 12.
62. See id. at 12–13; Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 610.
63. See Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for
Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1692 &
n.17 (1997).
64. FREDERICK J. DAY & HUONG N. TRAN, REGULATION OF WIRELESS
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 25 (1997).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see DAY & TRAN, supra note 64, at
25.
66. The FCC’s mandate is inscribed in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999).
67. The Communications Act gave the FCC “not niggardly but expansive powers.”
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). The
FCC was created and received its grant of executive power in 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999). The agency’s public interest mandates are contained in 47 U.S.C. §§
303, 307, 309.
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level responsibility.68 The first, is spectrum allocation—deciding which
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum will be used for which particular
uses.69 Thus, a certain range of spectrum is used for AM radio, another
range for FM, another for shortwave, and so on.70 Throughout the
history of government regulation, most usable portions of the spectrum
have been allocated to government, military, and space communications.71
After spectrum allocation, the FCC must perform the task of band
allotment—determining how many broadcast channels will be denoted
within each portion of spectrum, and exactly where those channels will
be.72 Finally, the FCC engages in channel assignment—deciding which
applicants will be allowed to use which channels and issuing the
appropriate license.73 In general, the FCC’s mandate to regulate the
electromagnetic spectrum consists of allocating spectrum, allotting
bands, and licensing broadcasters’ uses of particular channels as the
public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.74
2. The Public Interest Is Not Personal Interest:
The Case of the Goat Gland Doctor, 1930
In 1930, Dr. John R. Brinkley, of Milford, Kansas, was the owner of,
and a regular on-air personality on, the most popular radio station in the
United States.75 A year later, an attorney for Brinkley was appearing
before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals trying to get back the Doctor’s
broadcast license for radio station KFKB.76 The previous year, the FRC
had denied Brinkley’s application for license renewal on the grounds
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would not be served
if Brinkley was allowed to continue broadcasting.77 This was one of the
earliest decisions rendered by the FRC that used the agency’s
congressional mandate to regulate broadcasting “in the public interest”
to deny a licensee’s right to continue operating based on the licensee’s
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
1931).

JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 398 (2d ed. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
See DAY & TRAN, supra note 64, at 25.
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 26.
Id. at 27.
KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir.
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programming practices.78
What had Dr. Brinkley done to call forth the wrath of executive
administrative power? Brinkley came to prominence as the “goat gland
doctor,” a semiquack who sought “to rejuvenate the male sex drive by
implanting the gonads of a young Ozark goat in the patient’s scrotum.”79
Later, Brinkley developed a catalogue of medical remedies, known to
the public only by their numerical designations, which he prescribed for
a variety of ailments.80 Brinkley operated the Brinkley Hospital in
Milford, the Brinkley Pharmaceutical Association, and KFKB “in a
common interest.”81 The hospital paid KFKB $5000 to $7000 per month
for on-air advertising;82 the druggists in the Association paid an
advertising fee to KFKB for every sale of Brinkley’s concoctions.83
Brinkley’s daily “Medical Question Box” shows on KFKB, during
which he read and answered letters from listeners describing their
ailments, were the primary sales tool for the concoctions.84 The District
Court noted that in one 1930 broadcast of “Medical Question Box,”
“presumably representative of all, [Brinkley] prescribed for forty-four
different patients and in all, save ten, he advised the procurement of
from one to four of his own prescriptions.”85
The FRC, apparently alerted by “organized medicine,”86 found this all
too much to take. In denying Brinkley’s application for renewal of his
broadcast license, the FRC found that:
[T]he testimony in this case shows conclusively that the operation of Station
KFKB is conducted only in the personal interest of Dr. John R. Brinkley. While
it is to be expected that a licensee of a radio broadcasting station will receive
some remuneration for serving the public with radio programs, at the same time
the interest of the listening public is paramount, and may not be subordinated to
the interests of the station licensee.87

Thus, despite the popularity of KFKB,88 the FRC held that a person
could not operate a broadcast radio station primarily as an adjunct to
78. See Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 613.
79. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 26.
80. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 671.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 27.
87. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 671 (quoting the FRC’s “Facts and Grounds for Decision”
issued in the Brinkley hearing).
88. The relative popularity of KFKB was due in significant part to its extensive
broadcast range, spreading the Brinkley mix of fundamentalist theology and medical
information from the Rockies to the Mississippi River. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra
note 3, at 26.
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some business enterprise. Using the valuable and scarce electromagnetic
spectrum in such a self-interested manner was outside the public interest,
and Dr. Brinkley was forced to get off the air.89
3. Maximum Power Is Not in the Public Interest:
The Gary-Chicago Conflict, 1933
As commercial broadcasting became more widespread and profitable
during the 1930s and 1940s, the FRC-FCC’s regulatory regime, with
specific regulations based ultimately on a less than fully explicit concept
of the public interest, was tested in the federal courts. Big commercial
broadcasters, who pleaded for public interest based regulation to
mitigate the spectrum “chaos” of the 1920s,90 and then came to dominate
the best portions of the spectrum allocated for public uses under the
regulations,91 began to challenge FCC regulations in the courts.
In one early case, two Chicago stations challenged an FRC ruling that
terminated their license in order to allow a Gary, Indiana, station to
operate with less interference.92 The FRC found that WJKS in Gary
rendered excellent public service including broadcasts aimed at the
many foreign ethnic groups populating Gary.93 WJKS broadcast diverse
programs for the Gary area’s “Hungarian, Italian, Mexican, Spanish,
German, Russian, Polish, Croatian, Lithuanian, Scotch and Irish people.”94
The programs were “musical, educational and instructive in their nature
and stress[ed] loyalty to the community and the Nation.”95 WJKS also
regularly broadcast children’s programming in cooperation with local
schools and made time available to the local police, fraternal organizations,
and area religious organizations, all free of charge.96 The time-sharing
Chicago stations, operating at the same frequency as WJKS, were WIBO
and WPCC.97 WIBO played “a large number of chain programs originating
in the National Broadcasting network[,] . . . almost entirely commercial
89. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 672; see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 27.
90. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is the “Public Interest” in the Public Interest?: The
Broadcast License Bargain of 1927, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: HAVE
REGULATORS DIALED THE WRONG NUMBER? 49, 49–50 (Donald L. Alexander ed., 1997).
91. See STREETER, supra note 38, at 98.
92. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. (Station WIBO),
289 U.S. 266, 269 (1933) [hereinafter Nelson Bros. II].
93. Id. at 270–71.
94. Id. at 271 (quoting the FRC’s finding of facts).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 269, 272.
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in their nature,” and simultaneously available on “many other stations
located in the Chicago district.”98 WPCC was owned by the North Shore
Church and, like many other Chicago area stations, broadcast religious
programming and church information, mostly on Sundays.99
The FRC found that WJKS was subject to objectionable interference
from the Chicago stations, while “[t]he deletion of Stations WIBO and
WPCC would not deprive the persons within the service area of those
stations of any type of programs not now received from other stations.”100
Furthermore, the FRC reasoned, allowing WJKS to increase its power
and deleting the Chicago stations:
[w]ould work a more equitable distribution of broadcasting facilities within the
Fourth Zone, in that there would be an increase in the radio broadcasting
facilities of Indiana which is now assigned less than its share of such facilities
and a decrease in the radio broadcasting facilities of Illinois which is now
assigned more than its share of such facilities.101

The FRC specifically stated that these actions would serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.102 The terminated radio stations
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
reversed the FRC’s order, holding that the Commission’s decision was
“arbitrary and capricious,” and that the appellant Chicago stations were
“‘serving public interest, convenience, and necessity’ certainly to as
great an extent as [WJKS].”103
The Supreme Court then granted the FRC’s writ of certiorari.104 First,
the Court recognized its own legal jurisdiction to inquire into the facts
used by the Commission to determine whether it had acted within the
limits of its authority.105 Next, the Court acknowledged the power of
Congress to regulate broadcasting under its interstate commerce power,
stating that “[n]o state lines divide the radio waves, and national regulation
is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio
facilities.”106 Congress delegated its regulatory authority to the FRC,
which was mandated to license use of the spectrum in the public interest,

98. Id. at 272.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 271, 273.
101. Id. at 273.
102. Id.
103. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. (Station WIBO) v. Fed. Radio Comm’n,
62 F.2d 854, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (quoting the Chief Examiner’s findings from the FRC
hearing on the application).
104. Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 269.
105. Id. at 277–78.
106. Id. at 279. The courts agreed with the government’s view that since purely
local, intrastate stations can interfere with interstate broadcasts, regulation of all stations
is justified. See ZELEZNY, supra note 68, at 398.
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convenience, or necessity.107
As noted above, in the dispute between WIBO-WPCC and WJKS, the
public interest determination encompassed an analysis of the equitable
distribution of stations within a geographical area, as well as the kinds of
programming available for people in the specific, affected
communities.108 Generally, as many communities as possible should be
served in as particular ways as practicable.109 The Gary station, which
broadcast diverse community programming aimed at a wide section of
the population, was being obstructed by the Chicago stations, which
largely broadcast programming available on other area stations.110 The
FRC accordingly found that the public interest would be served by
terminating the Chicago stations’ licenses and allowing more power to
the Gary station.111 In analyzing the FRC’s decision, the Court wrote
that the public interest criterion:
is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer
unlimited power . . . [but] is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of
radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character, and quality of
services, and, where an equitable adjustment between States is in view, by the
relative advantages in service which will be enjoyed by the public through the
distribution of facilities.112

In applying this criteria to the Nelson Bros. case, the Court wrote that
the Commission:
was entitled [but not required?] to consider the advantages enjoyed by the
people of Illinois under the assignments to that State, the services rendered by
the respective stations, the reasonable demands of the people of Indiana, and the
special requirements of radio service at Gary. The Commission’s findings show
that all these matters were considered. . . . We are of the opinion that the
Commission’s findings of fact . . . support its decision, and an examination of
the record leaves no room for doubt that these findings rest upon substantial
evidence.113

So long as the FRC really does examine factors that are involved in
determining the public interest (in this case, the distribution of stations
and the populations served by those stations’ programming) and makes
reasonable findings of fact based thereon, the courts are not free to
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 279.
See supra text accompanying notes 100–01.
Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 279–80.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 285–86.
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second guess and proffer their own interpretations of how the public
interest should be defined in particular cases—that would be a judicial
infringement of executive authority.
4. The Networks’ Interest Is Not the Public Interest:
NBC v. U.S., 1943
A broader challenge to federal authority to regulate broadcast licenses
under the public interest standard came before the Supreme Court in the
1943 case, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, in which national
networks challenged the “chain broadcasting” rules crafted by the
FCC.114
In 1941 the FCC completed a three-year investigatory process by
promulgating rules that restricted the power of national networks of
radio stations engaged in what was then called “chain broadcasting.”115
At the time, the three national networks, NBC (which operated two
separate networks, the Red and the Blue), CBS, and the Mutual
Broadcasting System were affiliated with 341 of the 660 commercial
stations in the United States and controlled more than ninety-seven
percent of the valuable night-time broadcasting power in the country.116
The FCC’s Report on Chain Broadcasting did not criticize centralization
of stations per se, and recognized benefits of chain broadcasting, but
nevertheless concluded that the contracts the networks were requiring
their local affiliates to sign infringed, at least potentially, on the local
stations’ abilities to serve the public interest as their licenses required.117
The eight regulations proffered by the FCC were quite specific and
somewhat startling to a reader in the year 2001.118 For instance, the
Commission considered the fact that networks were requiring affiliates
to agree not to air programming from other networks.119 The Commission
found that “[a] licensee station does not operate in the public interest
when it enters into exclusive arrangements which prevent it from giving
the public the best service of which it is capable,”120 and promulgated a
regulation which read: “No license shall be granted to a standard
broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding,
express or implied, with a network organization under which the station
is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcasting the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Id. at 197–98.
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Id. at 198–209 (describing each regulation).
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 199 (quoting FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 52, 57 (1941)).

MARTIN.DOC

[VOL. 38: 1159, 2001]

3/3/2020 9:37 AM

Public Interest and Low-Power Radio
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

programs of any other network organization.”121 In approving this rule,
the FCC decided that since licensees were granted the privilege of a spot
on the spectrum in return for operating in the public interest, contractual
relations that could hinder the ability of stations to respond to the public
interest could be restricted.122 The FCC used the same rationale to curtail
the networks’ affiliate agreements with regard to territorial exclusivity,123
terms of affiliation binding for five years,124 and the right to reject network
programming.125 These restrictions were not placed on the networks
themselves, but on the affiliates—the recipients of licenses from the FCC.126
Thus, the Rules on Chain Broadcasting expressed the Commission’s policy
determination that a broadcast licensee who was willing to enter into
contracts that could restrict his ability to respond to the needs and
interests of his local community (the public interest) was not deserving
of the privilege of spectrum space.127
The networks went to court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the FCC
regulations.128 After the District Court granted the government’s motion
for summary judgment,129 the Supreme Court agreed to review the
decision.130 The networks put forth several arguments that “called upon
[the Court] to determine whether Congress has authorized the Commission
to exercise the power asserted by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations,
and if it has, whether the Constitution forbids the exercise of such
authority.”131
After describing the challenged Chain Broadcasting Regulations, the
decision, written by Justice Frankfurter, reviewed the history of
governmental regulation of radio broadcasting.132 The Court analyzed
the years leading up to the Radio Act of 1927 as a developing chaos of
too many radio stations doing whatever they wanted: “These new
121. NBC, 319 U.S. at 200 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1941)).
122. Id. at 209.
123. Id. at 200 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1941)).
124. Id. at 201 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1941)).
125. Id. at 204 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.105 (1941)).
126. Id. at 196.
127. See id. at 196–209.
128. Id. at 193.
129. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding
that the question of the FCC’s authority to issue Chain Broadcasting Rules was a matter
of law rather than fact, and that the basis of the rules on the FCC’s findings was neither
arbitrary nor capricious, and thus those findings were binding on the court).
130. NBC, 319 U.S. at 193.
131. Id. at 209–10.
132. Id. at 209–14.
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stations used any frequencies they desired, regardless of the interference
thereby caused to others. Existing stations changed to other frequencies
and increased their power and hours of operation at will. The result was
confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard.”133 The chaos was a natural consequence of “certain basic facts
about radio as a means of communication[;] . . . the radio spectrum simply
is not large enough to accommodate everybody.”134 This chaos, and the
hope of development, led Congress to pass the Radio Act.135 The
Court’s historical analysis concluded that federal regulation of radio
broadcasting was “essential.”136
Congress delegated its power to a federal agency (first the FRC, then
the FCC) that was under a general mandate to regulate the broadcast
spectrum in the public interest so as to “secure the maximum benefits of
radio to all the people of the United States.”137 The Commission had the
power to define the nature of the service to be rendered by licensed
stations,138 and make the legal regulations necessary to prevent interference
between stations and to carry out the provisions of the Communications
Act.139 Thus, the Commission’s power included, but was not limited to,
technical considerations: “the Act does not restrict the Commission
merely to supervision of the traffic [on the spectrum, but] puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.”140
So long as the government could make a cogent argument that a decision
or regulation was reasonably calculated to advance the public interest,
the ruling was entitled to a presumption of validity. Crucially, such
rulings had to include denying the right to broadcast to some people;
limiting the number of stations is how chaos would be avoided.141 So
long as these choices were based on which licensees would best serve
the public interest, the FCC would be operating within its delegated
power.
Furthermore, the Court denied that it had the authority to evaluate the
Commission’s decisions based on the Court’s own conception of the
public interest:
Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the “public interest” will be
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. The responsibility
belongs to the Congress for the grant of valid legislative authority and to the
Commission for its exercise.142

In determining whether the Commission’s regulations fit these criteria,
the Court reviewed each regulation, extensively quoting both the
findings regarding network practices and the public interest rationales
for each.143 The Court concluded that these regulations were intended to
advance the public interest, and were thus within the mandate of the
Communications Act.144 Finally, the Court held that since the FCC has
to regulate broadcasting by granting a limited number of licenses,
requiring some people to be shut out, the denial of a license based on a
valid exercise of power does not violate the free speech provisions of the
First Amendment.145
5. The FCC As Big Government:
The 1960 Program Policy Statement
NBC came to stand for the proposition that since there was a limited
amount of space on the spectrum, the government could restrict access to
the spectrum based on its conception of which potential licensees would
best serve the public interest.146 The FCC’s idea of the public interest
during this period focused on providing programming designed to meet a
variety of preferences found in the station’s local community.147 This
could be characterized as a manifestation of the New Deal ideology that
government should be actively involved in organizing aspects of social
life that have widespread public effects.148
The fullest development of this conception in regard to broadcasting is
found in a 1960 FCC Program Policy Statement, which identified fourteen
“major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest.”149 In
142. Id. at 224.
143. Id. at 198–209.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 226–27. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution asserts that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
146. NBC, 319 U.S. at 218.
147. See, e.g., Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 132–216 (Frank. J. Kahn ed., 3d
ed. 1978).
148. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to
Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 448–49 (2001).
149. Network Programming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg.
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order to determine “the tastes, needs and desires of the community,” the
FCC adopted “formal ascertainment requirements, which compelled
applicants for broadcast licenses to detail the results of interviews conducted
by the applicant with community ‘leaders’ in nineteen FCC specified
categories ranging from agriculture to religion.”150 Although this kind of
New Deal-style regulation made sense considering the FCC’s mandate
to make sure the spectrum is used in ways that serve the public interest,
it is not surprising that such regulation would draw the ire of
philosophical critics of government regulation.
C. The Marketplace Approach to the Public Interest
While the scarcity rationale undergirded the FCC’s regulatory regime
for three decades, some academics pressed alternative, business-oriented
approaches.151 Eventually, these views became part of the FCC’s
broadcast licensing policies.
1. The Economist’s Constitutional Argument:
The First Amendment and the Public Interest
By the early 1960s, Ronald Coase and other economists were voicing
a sustained critique of the FCC’s broadcast licensing practices, arguing
that they were hindering the efficient, market-based use of scarce
resources.152 The goal of Coase’s economic analysis is the conversion of
license holders into property owners who will be free to use their
property to seek economic advantage. The argument, however, begins
with an attack on FCC regulation as an infringement of the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters.153
With the approval of the courts, the FCC insisted that their regulations
did not restrict speech, but only access to the spectrum; once a
broadcaster met the requirements and was issued a license, the FCC was
7291, 7295 (July 29, 1960). The fourteen public interest elements identified in the report
are:
(1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use of
Local Talent, (3) Programs for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5)
Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorialization by
Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10) News
Programs, (11) Weather and Market Reports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service
to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming.
Id.
150. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 616.
151. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 36, at 14.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 7–12; see also Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing
Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990, 990–92 (1989) (critiquing government regulation
of the spectrum as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech and proposing a
private property system of spectrum ownership).
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forbidden from practicing censorship by both the First Amendment and
section 326 of the Communications Act.154 On the other hand, if a
broadcaster conducted his station in ways that were against the public
interest, he could lose his license.155 Is this a restriction on speech or a
requirement for a privilege? The FCC justified the difference between
broadcast and print media by pointing to the inherent scarcity of
spectrum; in the words of Justice Frankfurter: “the radio spectrum simply is
not large enough to accommodate everybody.”156
As the economists are quick to point out, scarcity is not a distinguishing
feature of the electromagnetic spectrum: “[l]and, labor, and capital are
all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation.”157
Advocates of an economic approach suggest that if spectrum regulation
is correctly based on scarcity, “[a] Federal Paper Commission would
then be necessary to decide how much paper would be available for
(say) books and how much for (say) wallpaper. The Commission would
further choose who was permitted to engage in book publishing.”158
This argument avoids the reality of the situation. The point is not just
that spectrum is scarce, but also that when it became apparent that
spectrum was useful, the government, as the representative of civil society,
claimed ownership. In other words, spectrum is scarce, and within the
United States it is owned by the government of the United States.159
Advocates of marketplace regulation acknowledge this ownership when
they call for government auctions of the right to use the spectrum.160
Given that the government owns the resource, the allocation of the
resource is properly a public policy decision.
154. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 103.
155. See, for example, the case of Dr. Brinkley discussed infra Part III.B.2.
156. NBC, 319 U.S. at 213.
157. Coase, supra note 36, at 14; see Spitzer, supra note 153, at 1013–14. The
same argument is made in KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 204, accompanied
by an economistic revision of the English language: “A ‘nonscarce resource’ is a
contradiction in terms.” Id. Nothing in the American Heritage Dictionary definition of
“resource” indicates that scarcity is an inherent quality of resources. See Resource, in
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1536 (3d ed. 1992).
158. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 18.
159. When this ownership was instituted, it was encouraged and accepted by the
major commercial interests, which generally endorsed the basic idea promoted at
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover’s Radio Conferences: the establishment of
government order was required to control the station interference that would keep the
medium from being profitable. See id. at 8–10, 19; STREETER, supra note 38, at 88–89,
246–47.
160. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 3, at 211–12.
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The issue of whom to allow to use the publicly owned spectrum is
fundamentally a question of programming practices, not infringements
on freedom of speech. Many of the cases in which broadcasters alleged
that the FCC infringed upon their free speech rights were fairness
doctrine cases.161 Basically, broadcasters claimed the freedom to keep
other people off of the broadcasters’ signals.162 The argument was that if
broadcasters have to let people on the air to respond to controversial
opinions or even personal attacks, broadcasters would be reluctant to
address controversial issues. In other words, broadcasters would address
controversial issues only if they were free to express certain views and
exclude others.163 Thus, the fairness doctrine did not restrict speech; at
most it restricted how much time could be given to one particular view
to the detriment of a competing view. Such restrictions on one-sided
debate were directly tied to the fact that a license to broadcast is not a
personal mouthpiece, the way a newspaper can be.164 A broadcaster can
only acquire the privilege to use the public spectrum if he is willing to
operate in the public interest as defined by the government as the
representative of the public.
This does not seem particularly difficult to understand or justify as a
public policy. Just as lessors can impose conditions on the use of their
property by lessees, the public owners of the spectrum can require it be
used in ways that are deemed advantageous to the public.
The economists’ comparisons to other media can be turned around.
Imagine that all the newsprint available in the United States could
suddenly only be produced from certain trees grown on a mountain in
Arizona that had been owned and managed by the government since
taking the land from Mexico in 1846. Newsprint would thus be a public
resource. A public policy is required to determine how to allocate the
newsprint. There are at least two distinct possibilities.
First, the government could sell the newsprint to the highest bidder.
This policy would directly serve the public interest by adding revenue to
the treasury. Economic analysts would also argue that there would be
“social benefit” when the paper is put to its “highest valued” use. In this
sense, the “highest valued” use generally means that which is most
161. The FCC’s “fairness doctrine,” repealed in 1987, required radio and television
licensees to (1) provide coverage of significant public issues and (2) ensure that the
coverage accurately presents conflicting views on those issues. KRATTENMAKER &
POWE, supra note 3, at 239.
162. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
163. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392–95 (1969). The
First Amendment argument in Red Lion is discussed in KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra
note 3, at 166.
164. See KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1931), discussed supra Part III.B.2.
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profitable for the investors.
Alternatively, the government could divide up the newsprint among all the
members of the public who wanted to use some of this valuable public
resource. This policy would advance the public interest by allowing a
fair say to all constituents. Of course, this would leave very little
newsprint for each person who wants to use it, so the policy could be
altered so that the newsprint is given to applicants who are willing to use
it in such a way that a wide spectrum of perspectives make it into print.
In other words, a printer could use the public resource to seek a profit so
long as some of the resource was used to advance the public policy goal
of facilitating access to a wide range of opinions and ideas.
These are both valid policies, and the decision which to implement
should be a policy decision mediated by the political process. Significantly,
though, the advocates of an economic approach to spectrum use have
sometimes sought to short circuit such a policy debate by arguing that
the fair-say allocation of spectrum is unconstitutional because it violates
the right to free speech.165 Thus, the field is purportedly left to the
economic interpretation. A skeptical reader might see this argument as
an attempt to remove the public (as reflected in an elected government)
from a meaningful say in how public resources are used. The insistence
that the use of a particular (or every) public resource should be
determined by how much profit private investors can reap may be a
plausible political perspective—a policy to seek to implement through
political mobilization—but to insist that some natural or constitutional
logic impels application of the “price mechanism” to public resources is
antidemocratic polemic.
To summarize, the First Amendment argument against FCC regulation
of broadcast licenses misconstrued the policy goal of ensuring a
diversity of perspectives as a restriction on broadcaster’s right to speak
freely. A more appropriate approach would have been to make the
policy argument that a marketplace system of regulation is in the public
interest. Eventually, as described in the case of WNCN Listeners Guild
discussed below,166 that was exactly the view the FCC adopted.

165.
166.

See, e.g., Coase, supra note 36, at 7–12.
See infra Part III.3.
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2. A Court’s View of the First Amendment and the Public Interest:
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 1989
The FCC decisions and court cases concerning television station
WTVH brought all these issues into play and ultimately determined that
the regulatory scheme was a matter of policy and not, at least as
presented by the FCC, a constitutional question.167 What became
the Syracuse Peace Council litigation started with a ruling that station
WTVH in Syracuse, New York, had violated the fairness doctrine when
it broadcast editorial advertisements advocating the construction of a
nuclear plant as a sound investment.168 Since this was “a controversial
issue of public importance,” the FCC ruled that the fairness doctrine
required that the station air contrasting viewpoints.169 In the administrative
proceeding, the Meredith Corporation, parent of WTVH, argued that the
fairness doctrine violated its right to free speech.170 But the FCC refused
to consider this argument based on a 1985 internal study that determined
that, while the fairness doctrine may violate the First Amendment by
“chilling” broadcasters’ speech, the constitutional issues were best left to
Congress and the courts.171
Meredith appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
that the FCC’s avoidance of the constitutional issues raised by Meredith
was improper and remanded the issue for reconsideration.172 On
remand, the plaintiff, Syracuse Peace Council, sought to preempt the
hearing of the constitutional issues because WTVH had since met the
requirements of the fairness doctrine by airing contrasting views on the
wisdom of constructing the power plant.173 But the FCC, which had
been inviting the courts and Congress to rule against the fairness doctrine,
refused to dismiss the issue, citing the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that the
FCC had erred in avoiding the constitutional issue.174
This time around, the FCC, under the leadership of Reagan appointee
and marketplace regulation advocate Mark Fowler, not only ruled that
the fairness doctrine violated the First Amendment, it also determined
that the fairness doctrine disserved the public interest, and then took the
opportunity to repudiate the scarcity justification of government spectrum
167. See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Complaint of Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5043 (1987).
168. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5034, 5044 (1987).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 5043–44.
172. Id. at 5044–45.
173. Id. at 5045.
174. Id. at 5046.
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regulation.175
Eventually, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s ruling, but on narrow
grounds that did not reach either the First Amendment argument or the
rejection of the scarcity rationale.176 Since the FCC determined that
application of the fairness doctrine was not in the public interest, as it
had discretion to do, it was not required to implement it.177 The court in
effect ruled that the FCC was required to regulate in the public interest,
but left the determination of what constituted the public interest up to the
agency and the political processes underlying it. In this way, the court
concurred in the argument that the system of programming regulation is
a policy question, not a constitutional one.
This new idea of the public interest advanced by the FCC in Syracuse
Peace Council is not wholly distinct from its constitutional argument
but, as the court noted,178 the argument basically followed the public
interest argument contained in the FCC’s Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the General
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees.179 There, the
FCC found that the fairness doctrine, “as a matter of policy, disserves
the public interest.”180
In both the Fairness Doctrine report and Syracuse Peace Council, the
FCC started by denying that the scarcity rationale remained apt in the
context of broadcasting: “The Commission found in recent years that
there had been an explosive growth in both the number and types of
outlets providing information to the public. Hence, the Supreme Court’s
apparent concern that listeners and viewers have access to diverse
sources of information has now been allayed.”181 This appears to be a
misguided argument, however. The basis of programming regulation is
that there is not enough spectrum for everyone who would like access to
it. The addition of hundreds of cable channels or thousands of Internet
sites does not change the fact that there is only so much spectrum
available and consequently some would-be broadcasters must be kept
175. Id. at 5047–48.
176. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
177. Id.; see also Logan, supra note 63, at 1703 & n.92.
178. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 656.
179. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 143 (1986) [hereinafter Fairness Doctrine Report].
180. Id. at 148.
181. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5053 (1987).
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off; this is the source of the need for regulation.
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit Court ignored the FCC’s argument that
scarcity is no longer an issue. Instead, the court focused on the FCC’s
assertion that: “In sum, the fairness doctrine in operation disserves both
the public’s right to diverse sources of information and the broadcaster’s
interest in free expression. Its chilling effect thwarts its intended
purpose, and it results in excessive and unnecessary government
intervention into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists.”182 By
basing its decision to abandon the fairness doctrine on its interpretation
of the public interest, “the Commission is exercising both its
Congressionally-delegated power and its expertise; it clearly enjoys
broad deference on issues of both fact and policy.”183 This is as far as
the court would allow itself to go: “it is an elementary canon that
American courts are not to ‘pass upon a constitutional question . . . if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.’”184 In other words, since the FCC made a reasoned policy
decision as to what constitutes the public interest, there was no need to
address any constitutional issue.185
The decision in Syracuse Peace Council is squarely in the tradition of
court opinions regarding the FCC’s programming regulations schemes:
so long as it is based on a reasonable argument, the FCC is free to
construe the public interest as it sees fit. This makes sense. The public
interest should be determined by public policy, and when new
administrations are elected, they should be able to implement their
conception of such policies, so long as they do not inhibit future
administrations from doing the same.
3. The Entertainment Marketplace as the Public Interest:
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 1981
In fact, the FCC had been promoting market regulation as the public
interest for several years before the Syracuse Peace Council litigation
raised any constitutional issues. This policy was vetted by the Supreme
Court in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, in which citizens groups
challenged the FCC’s authority to approve radio stations’ format changes
182. Id. at 5052.
183. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 658.
184. Id. at 657 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
185. One can feel some sympathy for the FCC: first the court admonishes the
Commission not to ignore the Meredith Corporation’s constitutional arguments, then it
says that such consideration was unnecessary. But this reversal only came about because
the FCC reversed itself with regard to the WTVH issue and included a public policy
determination along with its constitutional analysis.
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without a hearing.186
In 1976, the FCC issued a policy statement that found that requiring a
review hearing for every license renewal involving a station that changes
format against the wishes of some listeners was not in the public
interest.187 The Commission asserted that the task of deciding whether a
particular format change did or did not serve the public was too difficult,188
and that such review “inevitably deprives the public of the best efforts of
the broadcast industry.”189 The policy statement further asserted that
“the marketplace is the best way to allocate entertainment formats in
radio.”190 The Commission:
recognize[d] that the market for radio advertisers is not a completely faithful
mirror of the listening preferences of the public at large. But we are not
required to measure any system of allocation against the standard of perfection;
we find on the basis of the record before us that [format allocation by market
forces] is the best available means of producing the diversity to which the
public is entitled.191

Strangely, a few paragraphs later, the Commission disputed the idea
that diversity should be the goal of policy, citing a professor who “has
demonstrated that maximization of format diversity will not necessarily
lead to increased listener satisfaction.”192 In any case, the FCC had
186. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585–86 (1981).
187. In re Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (policy statement), reconsideration denied,
66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977).
188. Id. at 862–64.
189. Id. at 865.
190. Id. at 863.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 864. Exactly how the professor, Bruce Owen of Stanford University,
“demonstrated” this assertion is not clear from the text of the policy statement, but the
FCC accepted his argument as “clearly point[ing] to the conclusion” that the public
interest is not served by reviewing format changes:
Professor Owen shows that efforts to maximize format diversity through
regulatory fiat could very well result in a diminution of consumer welfare: a
format protected under the WEFM rationale [that format changes that leave a
community without a particular entertainment format require an FCC hearing
if there is a significant amount of public protest against the change] may be of
lesser value than the format which the broadcaster proposes to substitute.
There is no way to determine the relative values of two different types of
programming in the abstract. This is a practical, empirical question, whose
answer turns on the intensity of demand for each format. It is impossible to
determine whether consumers would be better off with an entirely new format
without reference to the actual preferences of real people. In these
circumstances, there is no reason to believe that government mandated
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begun interpreting the public interest in entertainment formats as best
achieved by allocation through market forces. According to this view, if
the people licensed to broadcast on the electromagnetic spectrum were
allowed to use that privilege to maximize profits, the public would get
what they want—the “public interest.”193
A coalition of citizen groups petitioned the court of appeals for review
of the new policy,194 and an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit sided with
the petitioners, ruling that the no-review policy was contrary to the
Communications Act and the court’s earlier decisions.195
But the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that:
[D]iversity is not the only policy the Commission must consider in fulfilling its
responsibilities under the Act. The Commission’s implementation of the
public-interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing
policies, is not to be set aside by the Court of Appeals . . . . The Commission’s
position on review of format changes reflects a reasonable accommodation of
the policy of promoting diversity in programming and the policy of avoiding
unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion.196

The Court seemed to stop short of the Commission’s faith in the market,
but it found a balancing of public and private interests that resulted in
the same policy. Ultimately, the Court did find that using the market to
allocate entertainment formats was an arguably reasonable approach to
promoting the public interest; therefore, the court of appeals had
restrictions on format changes would promote the welfare of the listening
public. Indeed, in view of the administrative costs involved in such a program
of regulation, and in view of the chilling effect such regulations would
doubtlessly have on program innovation, there is every reason to believe that
government supervision of formats would be injurious to the public interest.
The record in this proceeding clearly points to the conclusion that such a
program of regulation would not be compatible with our statutory duty to
promote the public convenience, interest and necessity, and we so find.
Id. Part of the problem with this “demonstration” is the fact that, under the WEFM
rationale, the hearing requirement is only triggered if some listeners have protested a
proposed format change, protests that obviously qualify as an “empirical” expression of
“the actual preferences of real people.” Id. Perhaps a larger number of listeners prefer
format B (e.g., rock and roll) to format A (e.g., classical), but if other stations are already
broadcasting format B, the addition of another rock station and the elimination of the
only classical station will not significantly increase listener satisfaction with the
available format choices. However, a switch to a more popular format probably will
enable a station owner to charge more for advertising.
193. Id. at 863–64.
194. Petitioners included the Office of Communications of the United Church of
Christ, the Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia, the WNCN
Listeners Guild, and Classical Music Supporters, Inc. See In re Development of Policy
Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 66 F.C.C.2d 78, 78 n.1
(1977).
195. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev’d,
450 U.S. 582 (1981).
196. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).
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overstepped its authority in denying the FCC discretion to implement the
policy.197
As probusiness administrations and Congresses during the 1980s and
1990s emphasized marketplace regulation of broadcast licenses, resulting in
passage of the 1996 Telecommunications (Telecom) Act, the industry
has been significantly transformed.198 The most notable change has been
in the area of station ownership requirements. Ultimately, the Telecom
Act removed restrictions on national ownership and relaxed restrictions
on local ownership; now one owner can own up to half of the radio
stations in a particular community.199 A commentator summarized these
trends:
Beginning in 1985, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed
radio ownership limits to increase competition and diversity in the radio
industry. These effects have been even more dramatic with the Telecom Act,
where the radio industry has experienced tremendous consolidation and the
number of radio station owners has dropped significantly. The number of radio
station owners has declined 11.7%; whereas the number of radio outlets has
dropped 2.5%. 200

Thus, whatever the intent of the legislators, the increasing consolidation
or centralization of radio station ownership has had at least two notable
effects: “less localism and diminished diversity.”201 In other words, the
radio signals currently broadcast within a particular community are less
a reflection or expression of that specific community and more a
loudspeaker of a national corporate culture.202 This is a foreseeable
effect of the marketplace regulation that Congress and the FCC came to
define as the public interest.

197. Id. at 603–04.
198. See Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, Comment, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust
Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 474 (2000).
199. See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 69 (1999).
200. Leeper, supra note 198, at 475–76.
201. Fofana, supra note 6, at 410.
202. This is exactly the kind of development that conservatives in the original sense
of the word would deplore; many people who call themselves conservatives today seem
driven more by a zealous faith in “the market” than by a concern with maintaining
traditional values and communities. See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, When Free Markets
Threaten Family Values, BUS. WK., May 17, 1999, at 23 (“Free markets, taken to an
extreme, can be unhealthy for traditional values.”).
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D. Low-Power FM Service and the Public Interest
In the midst of the media mergers that have come to encompass radio
broadcasting over the last fifteen years, popular dissent arose in the form
of low-power “pirate” or “micro” radio stations.203 Legend has the
modern low-power radio movement beginning in 1987 in the John Hay
Homes housing project in Springfield, Illinois, when Mbanna Kantako
began broadcasting Black Liberation Radio.204 Like Black Liberation
Radio, low-power stations were usually started by people who felt their
interests, perspectives, and tastes were not represented by the available
broadcast media; most low-power stations broadcast some combination
of community news, commentary, or entertainment programming.205
When a low-power station came to the FCC’s attention, inspectors
would seek to locate the station and shut it down; enforcement actions
included cease and desist orders, administrative hearings, forfeitures of
equipment and money, and sometimes court proceedings.206 In 1993, the
FCC sought a forfeiture from microradio activist Stephen Dunifer and
his station Free Radio Berkeley.207 With the help of members of the
National Lawyers Guild’s Committee for Democratic Communications,
203. See Brief for Mbanna Kantako, at 1–6, available at http://www.alankorn.com/
briefs/microradio_mbanna.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) (brief not filed). See
generally Fofana, supra note 6, at 416 (describing the appropriateness of low-power
radio as a way to bring diverse voices to radio broadcasting); Leeper, supra note 198, at
474 (explaining “[t]he mass consolidation of the radio industry [as] a result of two recent
developments: the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . and the use of
the 1992 Merger Guidelines by federal antitrust enforcement agencies”).
204. See Brief for Mbanna Kantako, supra note 203, at 1–6. According to the brief:
Until Kantako’s station went on the air, no Black owned or Black run stations
existed in Springfield. As a result, WTRA/Black Liberation Radio began
broadcasting community information and music unavailable anywhere else in
Springfield. In a given week, Kantako broadcasts the voices of anywhere from
20 to 50 persons from the community. This programming has included
interviews with authors, scholars and activists around the country concerned
about black genocide; lots of politically conscious rap and reggae music (no
sexist or materialistic stuff); discussions and commentary (from a critical
perspective) on local and national events effecting the Black community;
interviews with victims of police misconduct and abuse; criticism of the
NAACP and Urban League for being co-opted and irrelevant to current
conditions in Black America; anti-drug messages recognizing the drug plague
as a method of social control of Black men; severe criticism of U.S.
domination of people of color around the world; rebroadcasting of speeches by
Malcolm X, Minister Louis Farrakhan, Stokley Carmichael, Huey Newton,
Angela Davis, and other Black activists.
Id.
205. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4; see also Fofana, supra note 6, at
409.
206. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, §§ 47–48, 57–60.
207. United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
RUGGIERO, supra note 5, at 24–27.
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Dunifer argued that he was practicing free speech using the public
airwaves, and that the FCC’s broadcast licensing scheme was
unconstitutional.208 When the FCC rejected Dunifer’s constitutional,
statutory, and evidentiary arguments against the forfeiture, Dunifer filed
an Application for Review of the Forfeiture with the FCC.209 Rather
than consider these arguments in its own administrative proceeding, the
FCC filed suit seeking to enjoin Dunifer from engaging in unlicensed radio
broadcasting.210
Now, as a defendant in federal court, Dunifer again pressed his
constitutional challenge to the FCC’s right to keep noninterfering signals
off of the broadcast spectrum. Eventually, after a journey back to the
FCC, then back to the northern district of California, then finally to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Dunifer’s argument was dismissed on
procedural grounds: the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of FCC licensing regulations until the defendant had
exhausted internal FCC procedures, including applying for a license to
broadcast.211
When Dunifer’s defensive argument was dismissed and Free Radio
Berkeley was enjoined from further broadcasts, low-power broadcasters
in New York City filed a suit against Attorney General Janet Reno and
the FCC, again asserting a constitutional right to broadcast noninterfering radio signals.212 Specifically, the plaintiffs
claim[ed] a First Amendment right to speak over the electromagnetic spectrum
dedicated to radio broadcasting—an electronic public forum of virtually
unlimited character—subject only to reasonable time, place and manner
regulations that are even-handedly applied to all broadcasters, full-power and
low-power alike. Plaintiffs maintain that the present regulatory scheme for
radio broadcasting, . . . on its face and as applied to microradio stations, violates
their right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.213

In effect, the Free Speech plaintiffs were arguing that the FCC could
not allow some broadcasters access to the spectrum, while denying
access to others who were not interfering with anyone else. Notably,
208. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, §§ 84–99, for a similar argument.
209. Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1005.
210. Id. at 1005.
211. Id. at 1008. See Michael J. Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in the
Return to Localism, Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV.
1133, 1155–56 (1999).
212. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, at introduction.
213. Id.
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this argument is distinct from the free speech arguments advanced by the
marketplace regulation advocates and to some extent adopted by the
FCC.214 Those arguments focused on the “restrictive” requirement that
broadcasters provide access to the spectrum for people with contrasting
viewpoints on controversial issues.215 The Free Speech plaintiffs, on the
other hand, were arguing that the current regulatory regime:
authorizes the FCC to grant broadcast licenses to use exclusively assigned
frequencies (either in a given region or on a nationwide basis) to a relatively
few broadcast radio stations which are collectively owned by even fewer media
companies, thus effectively allowing a select group of favored speakers to
monopolize and therefore limit speech in the electronic public forum dedicated
to radio broadcasting[.]216

The Free Speech plaintiffs’ complaint hinged on the argument that the
broadcast spectrum constitutes a “public forum,” a contention supported
by the comments of then-FCC Chairman William Kennard.217 If the
spectrum is a public forum, allowing access to a privileged few would
violate the First Amendment. However, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed, that the FCC’s allocation of space on the broadcast
spectrum was not subject to public forum analysis.218 Ironically, the
second circuit decision cited the 1943 NBC decision for the proposition
that “radio has ‘unique characteristic[s]’ that prevent its being made
available to all who might seek to broadcast, [and therefore] the ‘right of
free speech does not include . . . the right to use the facilities of radio
without a license.’”219 Thus, the scarcity rationale the FCC had rejected
in its pursuit of a marketplace conception of the public interest reappears
to justify the FCC’s restrictions against noninterfering, low-power
broadcasters.
Ironically, before the courts of appeals decided Free Speech and
Dunifer, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for licensing
low-power stations.220 In January 2000, following a public comments
period, the FCC announced the structure of a new low-power FM
(LPFM) service and set up a schedule for receiving applications from
potential broadcasters.221
In the Proposed Rule Making in re Creation of Low-power radio
214. See infra Part III.C.1.
215. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 237–75; see also In re
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5043–44.
216. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, at introduction.
217. See id. § 36.
218. Free Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1999).
219. Id.
220. Proposed Rule Making, supra note 9, at 2471.
221. FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2205.

1190

MARTIN.DOC

[VOL. 38: 1159, 2001]

3/3/2020 9:37 AM

Public Interest and Low-Power Radio
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Service, the FCC stated that, “our goals are to address unmet needs for
community-oriented radio broadcasting, foster opportunities for new
radio broadcast ownership, and promote additional diversity in radio
voices and program services.”222 The FCC expressed the hope that a
new low-power radio service would “provide new entrants the ability to
add their voices to the existing mix of political, social, and entertainment
programming, and could address special interests shared by residents of
geographically compact areas.”223 In effect, the FCC was acknowledging
that the consolidation of radio station ownership that followed from the
institution of the marketplace conception of the public interest was not
meeting the needs of all communities and was not fostering sufficient
diversity in the “voices” on radio.224
The following year, when the rules for the new service were announced,
the Commission stated its belief that:
[T]he LPFM service authorized in this proceeding will provide opportunities for
new voices to be heard and will ensure that we fulfill our statutory obligation to
authorize facilities in a manner that best serves the public interest. . . . Our goal
in creating a new LPFM service is to create a class of radio stations designed to
serve very localized communities or underrepresented groups.225

Throughout the nontechnical portion of the report, public interest
goals are emphasized. The LPFM service is designed to “focus[] on
local needs;”226 “encourag[e] diverse voices on the nation’s airwaves and
creat[e] opportunities for new entrants in broadcasting;”227 “allow local
groups, including schools, churches and other community-based
organizations, to provide programming responsive to local community
needs and interests;”228 “foster a program service responsive to the needs
and interests of small local community groups, particularly specialized
community needs that have not been well served by commercial
222. Proposed Rule Making, supra note 9, at 2471.
223. Id. at 2476.
224. Id. at 2476, 2534(a) (Joint Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard and
Commissioner Gloria Tristani); see also Fofana, supra note 6, at 415–16. The New York
Times reported that, “William E. Kennard, the F.C.C. chairman, has said that adding
hundreds of low-power radio stations is one of his top priorities—a key way to
counteract the increasing consolidation of the industry into the hands of a relatively few
big profit-minded broadcasters.” David Leonhardt, Religious Groups at Odds with
G.O.P. on Radio Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A1.
225. FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2206.
226. Id. at 2210.
227. Id. at 2212.
228. Id. at 2213.
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broadcast stations;”229 and “assign licenses . . . in a manner that is most
likely to place them in the hands of local community groups that are in
the best position to serve local community needs.”230
In pursuit of these goals, the LPFM service was set up as a noncommercial
educational service.231 The report concluded that the need for local
service is best filled by noncommerical broadcasters: “[c]ommerical
broadcast stations, by their very nature, have commercial incentives to
maximize audience size in order to improve their ratings and thereby
increase their advertising revenues. We are concerned that these
commercial incentives could frustrate achievement of our goal in
establishing this service.”232 The FCC also promulgated rules restricting
ownership of LPFM stations. “In order to further our diversity goals and
foster local, community-based service, we will not allow any broadcaster
or other media entity subject to our ownership rules to control or to hold
an attributable ownership interest in an LPFM station . . . .”233
Having found locally based, community-oriented programming comprising
a variety of voices to be an aspect of the public interest, the FCC has
determined that that aspect of the public interest is not served by the
marketplace regulation of the broadcast spectrum. In order to ensure
that local communities have a place on the airwaves, the government
must carve out small zones of nonprofit territory. The Commission
seems to conclude that the local diversity aspect of the public interest runs
contrary to the “very nature” of commercial stations,234 while being inherent
in a low-power, noncommercial educational service. Thus, since LPFM
stations inherently promote the public interest, operators are not required to
meet the same public interest requirements as commercial broadcasters.
Every broadcast licensee is required to operate its station in the public interest.
Given the nature of the LPFM service, however, we conclude that certain
obligations imposed on full-power radio licensees would be unnecessary if
applied to LPFM licensees. We expect that the local nature of this service,
coupled with the eligibility and selection criteria we are adopting, will ensure
that LPFM licensees will meet the needs and interests of their communities.
Thus, . . . we will not adopt a rule requiring LPFM licensees to provide
programming responsive to community issues or to maintain a list of issues
addressed or specific programs aired.235

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2215–16.
234. Id. at 2213.
235. Id. at 2270. However, like all broadcasters, LFPM operators will be required
to follow the Political Programming Rules and “allow legally qualified candidates for
federal office reasonable access to their facilities, but because LPFM stations are
noncommercial educational facilities, they must provide such access on a free basis.” Id.
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Whether LPFM stations fulfill the FCC’s faith in their inherent ability
to serve local communities with diverse voices remains to be seen.236
What is clear is that the FCC has carved out an explicit “local” aspect of
the public interest within the currently dominant marketplace conception.
The broadcast industry’s intense resistance to and lobbying against the
new LPFM service suggests that the incoherence of these two public
interests is indeed significant and quite likely the source of a continuing
political struggle.237
at 2273.
236. The New York Times estimates that of the approximately 750 applicants for
LPFM licenses in the first ten states from which applications were accepted, 47% were
churches and other religious groups, while 18% came from community groups.
Leonhardt, supra note 224, at C8. Perhaps perceiving a competitive threat, the National
Religious Broadcasters Association joined the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) and National Public Radio (NPR) in opposing LPFM. Leonhardt, supra note
224, at C8. One LPFM applicant, Sanford Kravette, pastor of the Christian Fellowship
of New England, in Center Conway, N.H., told the Boston Globe that he would like to
use an LPFM license “to read the Gospel of John, verse by verse, and then help people
relate it to everyday life.” D.C. Denison, Public Radio, FM Upstarts Tangling over
Licenses: Low-Power Outlets Say Issue Is Competition, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000,
at C1. Pastor Kravette’s idea may be a legitimate use of public spectrum, but if the
Center Conway area, like many in the United States, already gets New Testamentoriented programming from one or more existing full-power stations, then granting an
LPFM license to the Christian Fellowship of New England is probably not the best way
to add diversity to the voices on the local airwaves. If there is no New Testament
programming in the area, Pastor Kravette would be an ideal LPFM licensee.
237. Not surprisingly, the commercial broadcasters have reversed course and
returned to their 1920s evocation of the interference-scarcity rationale to protect their
control of the spectrum and resist the possibility of less regulated, locally based
competition. In an attempt to derail the LPFM service, the NAB not only lobbied
Congress, but also filed suit in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In its brief for the
court, the NAB made three arguments:
First, when the FCC adopted the LPFM rules, it reversed its long-standing
policy that low-power services are an inefficient use of spectrum, and it
provided no explanation of that reversal. Second, according to NAB, the
commission disregarded evidence showing that the implementation of LPFM
would cause substantial interference to existing FM service. Third, the
commission has insisted that the benefits of LPFM would outweigh any costs,
but it has failed to undertake a proper cost/benefit analysis.
Harry Martin, FCC Update: NAB Files Brief on LPFM Issues, BE RADIO, Sept. 30,
2000, 2000 WL 7260614. For a plea that the NAB drop their opposition to LPFM, see
William E. Kennard, Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters (Apr. 11,
2000), 2000 WL 369665 (F.C.C.).
In the 2000 Congress, Senator Gregg of New Hampshire introduced Senate Bill 2068,
the “Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act,” which would have completely banned a lowpower service; Senator Grams of Minnesota offered Senate Bill 3020, a “reasonable
compromise” measure cheered by the NAB and NPR, which would allow a severely
curtailed LPFM. Bill to Cut Back LPFM Introduced in Senate, PUB. BROADCASTING
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IV. CONCLUSION
The broadcast spectrum is a public resource that is to be administered
and used in the public interest. The public nature of this valuable
resource calls for policy and decision making that is as close as possible
to the democratic processes that reflects the will of the public. For this
reason, the role of the judiciary is appropriately limited. Courts have
properly refrained from interposing specific ideas of the public interest
when called upon to render decisions regarding FCC policies.
The public interest should be defined through public policy determinations
vetted through political processes that are subject to democratic controls.
Courts should continue to find ways to let the FCC operate without the
imposition of specific meanings on the idea of the public interest. That
being said, there is one way the courts should be prepared to put an
appropriate brake on the FCC’s power to define the public interest:
courts should take a long-term view and protect public resources for
future generations that have no power over legislators in the present. In
other words, if the FCC decided it was in the public interest to sell
REP., Sept. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8774518 [hereinafter Bill to Cut Back
LPFM]; see Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, S. 2068, 106th Cong. (2000),
WL 1999 CONG US S 2068; Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, S. 3020,
106th Cong. (2000), WL 1999 CONG US S 3020. In December 2000, the language of
Senate Bill 3020 was “included virtually word-for-word” in a budget bill for the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary. LPFM Rollback Included
in Commerce-Justice Bill, PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Nov. 3, 2000, available at 2000
WL 8774551 [hereinafter LPFM Rollback]; Press Release, The White House, Statement
by the President (Dec. 27, 2000), LEXIS-NEXIS, News Group File, All [hereinafter
Statement by the President]. President Clinton reluctantly signed the bill into law,
writing that:
[T]his bill greatly restricts low-power FM radio broadcast. Low-power radio
stations are an important tool in fostering diversity on the airwaves through
community-based programming. I am deeply disappointed that Congress
chose to restrict the voice of our nation’s churches, schools, civic organizations
and community groups. I commend the FCC for giving a voice to the
voiceless and I urge the Commission to go forward in licensing as many
stations as possible consistent with the limitations imposed by Congress.
Statement by the President, supra.
The limitations imposed by Congress included restricting LPFM stations from
frequencies within third adjacent channel separation from incumbent broadcasters. See
Bill to Cut Back LPFM, supra; LPFM Rollback, supra. After detailed study and
analysis, the FCC intended to restrict LPFM stations from second adjacent channels of
existing stations. See FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2235–46. The budget
bill’s restriction of third adjacent channels has the effect of limiting LPFM stations to the
least populated parts of the country and has resulted in the FCC issuing half as many
licenses as originally intended to applicants from the first twenty states from which
applications were accepted. See Kevin Diaz, Low-Power FM Radio Stations Dealt Blow
in Congress’ Budget: Modest Plan Ran Into Major Static, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Dec. 22, 2000, at A15; Stephen Labaton, 255 Licenses Are Awarded for LowPower FM Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at C5.
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permanent property rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, courts
should intervene to forestall the deprivation of the opportunity to use
irreplaceable public resources to later “publics” in ways that they determine to
be in their interest.
So long as there is not enough spectrum to allow everyone who so
desires to broadcast a signal, broadcast spectrum is scarce. The FCC
should not use its discretion to do away with the scarcity rationale.
Pointing to the proliferation of cable television channels and Internet
websites is not a legitimate argument for lessening the public interest
standards in broadcast licensing. The scarcity of space on the spectrum
should continue to play a central role in determining the public interest
in broadcast licenses.
Congress is the institution designed to reflect the will of the national
public most directly. The advocates of LPFM should be certain that
members of Congress understand the FCC’s rationale for an LPFM
service, specifically that the public interest in the broadcast spectrum
includes the facilitation and availability of diverse local voices and
perspectives. Advocates should encourage members of Congress to
show resolve in the face of the resistance to an LPFM service being
exerted by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and National
Public Radio.
Unfortunately, members of Congress have shown a willingness to
serve as the transmitters of the incumbent broadcasters’ distortions of the
reality of LPFM.238 Rather than defer to the technical expertise of the
FCC’s engineering studies,239 which determined that second adjacent
channel protection was sufficient to protect the signals of existing
broadcasters, Congress passed a year-end budget bill that adopted the
NAB’s position that current broadcast stations required third adjacent
channel protection (a bigger cluster of competition-free frequencies) and
that more study was needed before LPFM stations could be licensed in
238. See Bill to Cut Back LPFM, supra note 237.
239. See FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2235–46. The FCC’s study
included an analysis of the interference study submitted by the NAB and concluded that
the signal to noise ratio criteria employed in the NAB study were not appropriate and
were based on a level of noninterference higher than currently required for full-power
broadcasters. Id. at 2243. In addition, the NAB tests included more of the lowest quality
radio receivers than other studies. Id. at 2246. Even accepting the NAB’s worst-case
scenario assumptions, the FCC found that “the area where such [lowest-quality]
receivers could potentially experience degradation from interference is small, generally 1
km or less from an LPFM antenna site.” Id. at 2245.
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third adjacent channels.240 This effectively cut in half the number of
available LPFM licenses.241 Perhaps it is not surprising that members of
Congress would side with a powerful trade association representing the
interests of big media corporations over the interests of the many diverse
applicants for LPFM licenses.242 So long as members of Congress must
rely on private contributions to finance election campaigns, interests
with money to donate have the upper hand over more popular, lessmoneyed constituencies. The battle over the third adjacent channels
could be a proving ground for the power of a grassroots movement to
force corporate interests to accept the public’s right to access public
resources as producers rather than as consumers.
Those members of Congress who believe that the public interest in the
broadcast spectrum includes the availability of diverse, local perspectives
should consider requiring the FCC to recognize spectrum scarcity as a
relevant factor in determining the public interest in broadcast licenses.
More broadly, Congress members should actively solicit the opinions of
their constituents regarding use of the electromagnetic spectrum. What
value do constituents place on using the spectrum: mass media driven by
the entertainment marketplace; a public forum of local voices and
participation; some combination of both; or something else altogether?
In other words, how would an informed public want to use this public
property? In a democracy, that decision should constitute the public
interest.
ARTHUR MARTIN

240. LPFM Rollback, supra note 237.
241. See Labaton, supra note 237, at C5; Diaz, supra note 237, at A15. Proceeding
under Congress’s restrictions, the FCC had issued one hundred construction permits for
LPFM stations as of August 2001; as many as five hundred more may be issued around
the country. See Bill McConnell, FCC’s Sound Choice: Streamlining Procedures Is
Priority for New Radio Chief, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 13, 2001, at 42. Given the
one to three mile radius of an LPFM signal and Congress’s exclusion of stations from
urban areas, these six hundred LPFM stations will reach a tiny percentage of the public.
242. In introducing legislation that would reverse the budget language restricting
LPFM, Senator John McCain noted that during the previous Congress, “special interest
forces opposed to low-power FM radio, most notably the National Association of
Broadcasters and National Public Radio, mounted a successful behind-the-scenes
campaign to kill low-power FM radio without a single debate on the Senate floor.” Press
Release, Senator John McCain, McCain Introduces Low-power radio Bill (Feb. 27,
2001), LEXIS-NEXIS, News Group File, All.
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